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The concept of alternative development (AD) in international drug control has evolved over 
the past four decades, with several major milestones between the two United Nations General 
Assembly Special Sessions on the World Drug Problem (UNGASS) 1998 and 2016. However, it was 
not until UNGASS 2016 that the door for development-oriented thinking in international drug 
policy was pushed wide open. The Chapter VII of the UNGASS 2016 Outcome Document not only 
assigns a prominent role to AD, but also seeks to broaden the scope of development towards 
urban drug markets and drug trafficking, formerly exclusive realms of law enforcement and 
repressive measures of drug supply control. Therefore, in the field of development a major revo-
lution has taken place through the unequivocal broadening of the scope of development within 
UN drug control, feeding directly into the much-needed approximation of the UN drug control 
system and the Sustainable Development Goals. The article sheds light on the evolvement of 
the German approach of alternative development that has been influential at the international 
level in the shaping of the global drugs and development nexus.
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Introduction: Drugs as a Development Issue?
The global drug control regime has not always recognized developmental approaches to be a relevant com-
ponent within the pillars of the UN drug control system. It is only the UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic 
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988), the last of the three conventions that constitute the 
basis of the current control regime, which makes a reference to rural development measures to ‘increase the 
effectiveness of eradication efforts’ (UN 1988: §14, 3a). It unmistakably assigns development interventions a 
subordinate role towards repressive measures to deal with the issue of illicit drug crop cultivation. However, 
single UN member states have started at an earlier stage to understand the persisting supply of plant-based 
narcotic drugs as a consequence of development deficits among the traditional source countries of drugs 
such as cocaine, heroin and cannabis. Amidst a domestic opioid use crisis in the 1980s, the German gov-
ernment decided to strengthen its anti-narcotics efforts through development interventions in drug source 
countries. Starting with the Thai-German Highland Development Programme in 1981, German development 
cooperation has since then been one of the key proponents of a development-oriented approach to address 
the world drug problem, focusing on the issue of illicit drug crop cultivation. At the core of the paradigm 
of a development-oriented drug policy approach is the recognition that many drug-related problems are 
entrenched with development deficits and are not predominantly incentivised by the purpose of criminal 
gains. Therefore, according to the German approach of alternative development (BMZ 2013), illicit drug crop 
cultivation is considered to be driven by underlying root causes that should be properly understood, analysed 
and addressed with the means of socio-economic development. Phenomena such as illicit drug crop cultiva-
tion are considered a symptom of underlying deficits in development, but not as the problem as such. As 
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fieldwork and research has shown (see e.g. Garzón and Gelvez 2018; GIZ 2014; Reuter 2010; Thoumi 2010; 
UNODC 2015; Mansfield 2016), illicit drug production is in many cases driven by poverty, lack of access to 
land and legal markets, poor infrastructure, insecurity and persisting armed conflict that is fed by illegal drug 
economies. 
From Alternative Development to Sustainable Development?
While this understanding may appear to be almost commonsensical in 2018, the notion of drugs as a devel-
opment issue is rather recent. It has not always been accepted by the governing institutions of international 
drug policy, such as the Commission of Narcotic Drugs (CND) and related organs, as can be seen in the late 
appearance of the term ‘rural development’ within the 1988 Convention. Until a few years back, only few 
governments included development-oriented approaches in their domestic or international drug control 
strategies, most of them from Southeast Asia (e.g. Thailand) and South America (e.g. Bolivia, Colombia and 
Peru). Based on the engagement of those governments, on many occasions seconded by Germany and other 
European governments, alternative development (AD) was established gradually as an element of UN drug 
supply control policies. The 1998 UNGASS Action Plan on International Cooperation on the Eradication of 
Illicit Drug Crops and on Alternative Development recognized AD as:
‘a process to prevent and eliminate the illicit cultivation of plants containing narcotics and psy-
chotropic substances through specifically designed rural development measures in the context of 
sustained national growth and sustainable development efforts in countries taking action against 
drugs, recognizing the particular socio-economic characteristics of the target communities and 
groups, within the framework of a comprehensive and permanent solution to the problem of illicit 
drugs’ (UNGA 1998b).
The 1998 Special Session of the General Assembly included AD as one element to attain the then-defined 
goal of eliminating the totality of global drug crop production within ten years. While the forthcoming ten 
years passed by without getting overwhelmingly close to this objective, 1998 may still be considered the cru-
cial moment for AD as a future wild card for development within the UN drug control system. Subsequently, 
AD maintained its role in UN drug control, persisting to be the only development-oriented approach inside 
the rather repressive set of agreed-upon instruments to tackle the global supply of illicit drugs. The 1998 
Political Declaration (UNGA, 1998a) also enshrined the principles of shared responsibility and balanced 
approach as guiding principles of the UN drug control system, obliging the consumer countries of plant-
based drugs to support the source countries – most of them developing countries – in their efforts to tackle 
the production of coca, opium poppy and cannabis. The universal recognition of a shared responsibility 
of producer and consumer countries, since then repeated innumerable times by Commission on Narcotic 
Drugs (CND) resolutions, is the continuing basis for an engagement of OECD-based donors and develop-
ment agencies in supporting source and more recently also transit countries in their efforts to reduce the 
supply of illicit drugs. Thereby, the principle of shared responsibility turned out to be the life insurance for 
AD in the decades to come, with AD being established as a ‘soft version’ (Reuter 2010: 112) of supply control. 
It is only until recently that some of the countries affected by massive drug crop production have become 
increasingly independent from international funding and donor efforts in promoting AD, in some cases tak-
ing over a donor or advisory role in third countries, even beyond regional boundaries (Felbab-Brown 2017).
However, the approach of AD was both considered a very limited concept addressing exclusively the illicit 
cultivation of coca and opium poppy, and – therefore – a regionally very limited approach, with actual 
implementation only in Southeast Asia and South America. Hence, the concept was far from being univer-
sally endorsed, regularly questioned regarding its effectiveness and plagued by widespread misinterpreta-
tions of its possible impact. The concept of AD in international drug control has been evolving ever since, 
with several milestones between UNGASS 1998 and UNGASS 2016. While the Political Declaration and Plan 
of Action 2009 (…) to Counter the World Drug Problem (UN CND 2009) adopted the broader term of ‘devel-
opment-oriented drug control’ to describe socio-economic interventions addressing a wide range of drug-
related problems beyond the mere drug crops, this term could not sustainably replace the term AD – and by 
that narrow down the concept (UNODC 2015: 77–78).
It was not until the UNGASS 2016 that the door for development-oriented thinking in international drug 
policy was pushed wide open. Chapter VII of the UNGASS 2016 Outcome Document not only assigns a 
prominent role to AD but goes even further in seeking to broaden the scope of development towards urban 
drug markets and drug trafficking (UNGA 2016: 7h, j, k), formerly exclusive realms of law enforcement 
Brombacher and Westerbarkei: From Alternative Development to Sustainable Development 91
within drug supply control. The global endorsement of a broadened role of development within the widely 
perceived bellicose UN drug control system may have come as a surprise for observers, but has clearly been 
the consequence of a process initiated more than a decade before. 
The German Approach of AD and Development-oriented Drug Policy
Germany, through the Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), is one of the few 
current and former CND members that has adopted a development pillar in its international drug policy at 
an early stage (Drug Commissioner of the Federal Government 2012), enshrined within the corresponding 
EU framework documents on drugs (Council of the European Union 2006, 2012, 2017). The current stance 
on AD of the BMZ (BMZ 2013) is the product of a long-standing engagement of German development coop-
eration that goes back to the early 1980s. The Federal Government realized the transnational character of 
global drug markets at a time when a heroin epidemic heavily hit Germany and other European countries 
(BMZ 2012). 
BMZ started its cooperation with drug source countries earlier than the international recognition of the 
principle of shared responsibility. The first German government-funded AD project was the Thai-German 
Highland Development Programme. Lasting from 1981 to 1998, the joint project of the Thai and German 
governments has until today remained the longest-standing AD programme. Its objective was to promote 
the development of the northern opium poppy growing regions right at the core of the Golden Triangle. 
Today, the project is considered a far-reaching best-case study for the success and sustainability of AD and 
the added value of international cooperation in this field (BMZ 2012: 41). 
The Thai-German Highland Development Programme was groundbreaking and turned out be seminal for 
the forthcoming approach of development-oriented drug policy within German development cooperation. 
Within this framework, the understanding of AD as an intervention seeking to address the root causes of 
illicit drug economies evolved, as opposed to a mere means of narrowly defined crop substitution.
Subsequently, in 1990 the BMZ for the first time commissioned the then GTZ GmbH with the implemen-
tation of a headquarter-based international drug policy programme, the so-called Action Programme Drug 
Control. The multilateral character of the drugs issue and the growing role of the UN in the definition of 
guiding norms on AD post-1988 led to the initiation of the Programme. It was mandated to internation-
ally promote the approach of AD and related development-oriented interventions on both the supply and 
demand side within German development cooperation and on an international level. For almost three dec-
ades now, the BMZ has commissioned both headquarter-based and field operations in the area of develop-
ment-oriented drug policies, implemented by the GIZ GmbH, NGOs and United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC) field offices.
The current BMZ approach of AD and the National Strategy on Drug and Addiction Policy (Drug 
Commissioner of the Federal Government 2012) is based on the idea of addressing the frameworks lead-
ing to the establishment of illicit drug economies: poverty, weak statehood, ongoing armed conflict, lack of 
infrastructure, lack of technical capacity for legal agriculture and lack of access to productive means such as 
land. The fact that only very few drug crop producing countries provide almost the universal supply of illicit 
cocaine and heroin is the crucial argument for a development-oriented approach to address this problem. If 
only a handful of countries in the world almost monopolize the global production of opium poppy and coca 
bush, even though many more could do so, it is not criminal rent seeking but the deficits in development 
that should be addressed (Reuter 2010: 99–100). A common misconception regarding this approach is the 
highly profitable value chain of illegal drugs, which, thus the assumption, makes it impossible for legal AD 
production to compete. However, this argument does not properly apply to the farmers cultivating illegal 
drugs. Their market share of the profit generated from illegal drugs is marginal. The value of the raw mate-
rial of coca leaf and opium poppy is low and represents only a negligible part of the retail price on major 
consumer markets in the Global North. Cocaine and heroin are in general derived from cheap agricultural 
products, where value is generated through the export of these refined substances under conditions of 
illegality. Small-scale farmers do not benefit from the exponentially growing value generated through the 
drug export, but they are taking the risk of cultivating drug crops under illegality (Brombacher & Maihold 
2009: 18–20; Brombacher 2013: 270–274). The risk of drug crop eradication, exposure to criminal networks 
and non-state armed groups as well as criminalization by law enforcement agencies heavily diminishes the 
incentives of drug crop cultivation. Hence, the practice of AD shows that farmers usually display a strong 
self-interest in turning to alternative options of legal agricultural production. Such options are safer and 
financially comparable to coca leaf or opium poppy, allowing the farmers to distance themselves from public 
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repression, highly unpredictable war economies and organized crime players. The medium- and long-term 
stability and reduced risk environment of a licit livelihood is preferred over short-term financial gains of a 
drug crop based income system. Even in the traditional and partly legally regulated coca growing areas in 
Bolivia, Peru and, on a very small scale in Colombia, very similar patterns emerge. The ‘dual use’ (Brombacher 
2013: 274) character of growing coca and the under-regulation of the licit market for traditional uses exposes 
coca farmers in Bolivia and Peru to similar risks as in predominantly illegal drug markets (Thoumi 2003: 
79–80; Brombacher 2013: 264–266).
Parallel to the growing awareness that the nexus of development and drugs is key to understand and tackle 
drug crop cultivation, the indicators of how to measure the impact of those interventions have evolved. The 
mixed results of AD projects can often be explained with a pattern of short-term oriented supply side indica-
tors, i.e. prioritizing the reduction of highly visible illicit crops in the short-term over the difficult-to-attain 
data on human development on the mid- and long-term (see e.g. Garzón & Gelvez 2018; Lupu 2004; Reuter 
2010: 113–115; Mansfield & Pain 2005; Mejía & Posada 2010; IEGDPM 2018). While the predominant impact 
measurement paradigm has been the amount of reduced hectares of drug crops, several development agen-
cies and international experts have promoted the use of human development indicators in analyzing the 
results of AD interventions (TNI 2014: 66–67). Poverty is the crucial element in this changing paradigm of 
impact assessment, even though the relationship between poverty and the emergence of rural drug econo-
mies is complex and controversial (Thoumi 2003: 48–50). If poverty is recognized as a key driver of emerging 
or persisting drug economies, then poverty reduction should be the key indicator to measure the success of 
AD – and not the reduction of surface under drug crops. While this logic is widely accepted scientifically, it 
is politically less attractive than a clear case for short-term reductions in illicit crops. Therefore, the double-
target problem (seeking the reduction of crops in the short-term, while promoting development on the 
long-term) is still dominant in international debates and impedes the operationalizability of AD (BMZ 2013: 
8; Farthing & Kohl 2005). 
On a domestic level, the respective BMZ terminology evolved in 2008 from the term development-ori-
ented drug control to development-oriented drug policy. This change recognized the non-control character 
of promoting rural development in drug crop cultivating areas and prioritized the framework conditions as 
key targets of such interventions instead of the illicit crops as such (BMZ 2012: 43–46). The very term AD 
may therefore be misleading, since it connotes a rather substitution-oriented strategy in dealing with illicit 
drug crops. While the BMZ today also operates with the term ‘rural development in drug crop producing 
regions’ to describe its efforts in this field (BMZ 2013), others use the term ‘promotion of sustainable/licit 
livelihoods’ (UNODC 2015: 80–81; Mansfield 2017: 9). However, due to the universal inter-governmental 
acceptance of the term AD and despite persisting expert criticism (see e.g. Mansfield & Pain 2005; Buxton 
2015), it has survived any intents for replacement at the UN level. At the same time, the alternative liveli-
hood approach is often used in a similar way to the concept of AD. Both terms coexist without a clear-cut 
distinction between them, being a ‘concept in flux’ (UNODC 2015: 81).
Playing the Development Wild Card: From the 2009 Plan of Action 
towards UNGASS 2016
The logical development of a truly development-led approach to address illicit drug economies in rural set-
tings – with a set of development-based impact indicators – has not been an unidirectional process. Even the 
recognition of the proper sequencing principle, universally accepted through the 2009 UN Plan of Action 
(§47f), cannot be interpreted as a general acceptance of a prioritization of development over eradication 
in dealing with illicit drug crops, since the repressive element of eradication is terminologically only post-
poned by the very term of proper sequencing. Additionally, this principle has never again found universal 
recognition in any other of the forthcoming UN framework documents on drugs, with the notable exception 
of the UN Guiding Principles on Alternative Development 2013 (UNGA 2013: §A9), even though based on 
very controversial negotiations on this issue. The 2014 Joint Ministerial Statement1 and the 2016 UNGASS 
Outcome Document do not include the literal reference to the term ‘proper sequencing’, a clear setback in 
terms of UN language.
While BMZ has been a key proponent of this principle and a development-oriented approach within the 
UN drug control system, only the alliance of several champions from governments, the UNODC and civil 
 1 Outreach to new Stakeholders in the Field of Alternative Development (United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs 13–21 March 
2014 Conference Room Paper E/CN.7/2014/CRP.7) 
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society has made it possible to emancipate a holistic development approach from a rather phenomeno-
logically superficial and symptom-oriented global drug control system. Due to the well-known difficulties 
of consensus-based decision making in the creation of unanimously accepted principles at the UN level, 
BMZ opted early for the promotion of networks of like-minded actors in further defining and promoting 
the concept of AD. The international 2002 Feldafing Conference, hosted by BMZ and several partners from 
civil society and the UN, was a milestone at that point. The Feldafing Declaration built the basis for the 
2002 CND-Resolution 45/14, calling ‘upon Member States to exploit more fully the potential of alterna-
tive development as an appropriate means of drug control, as well as sustainable human development’. 
The strength of the strategy to convene interested parties outside the formal UN system, afterwards suc-
cessfully replicated in the Thailand- and Peru-led ICAD-initiative (International Conference on Alternative 
Development 2011 and 2012) that drafted the UN Guiding Principles on Alternative Development 2013, 
lies in the linkage of implementation-based experiences and their ex post translation into UN normative. 
Germany, through BMZ and its implementing agencies, has used its decades-long experience of implement-
ing AD projects in countries as diverse as Thailand, Myanmar, Laos, Afghanistan, Bolivia, Peru and Colombia 
as basis for feeding those experiences back to the international level and into the drafting processes at the 
UN level.
The club character in promoting AD globally was maintained through the ICAD II in 2015, hosted by 
the Government of Thailand, seeking to foster the implementation of the UN Guiding Principles (GPDPD 
2015; ICAD 2 2015). The spirit of ICAD has been taken up by the Thai Mae Fah Luang Foundation – a widely 
acclaimed royal Thai foundation with decades of experience in implementing AD projects within Thailand 
and other countries in Asia. Furthermore, the UNODC secretariat and BMZ established a series of Expert 
Group Meetings, which have meaningfully contributed to the broadening of the scope of development 
within the UN drug control system. Through a continuous expert dialogue, the negotiations for the UNGASS 
2016 Chapter VII were seconded and the respective negotiations accompanied (UN CND 2016). Civil society 
played a crucial role in this process, since relevant NGOs such as the Transnational Institute (TNI) and 
Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) thrive to bring in the perspective of affected communities in 
drug crop producing areas into the international debate that is frequently government-centric.
Not surprisingly, the process of widening the leeway for development within international drug control 
was favored by the increasing disenchantment of some UN Member States, civil society and academia with 
the high societal and political costs of a merely repressive approach in dealing with their domestic drug 
policies (Collins 2014: 9). While some have opted for blaming the UN conventions for the unintended 
consequences of drug control, others have started to seek alternative drug policy options within the UN 
drug control framework, i.e. adopting certain elements of the AD approach and translating them into 
their domestic drug policies. While for decades, only a few UN Member States had engaged in the inter-
national debates on AD, recently more and more governments have taken over a development-oriented 
stance (UN CND 2014). AD appeared to be almost universally accepted in the framework of the UNGASS 
2016 preparation process.2 A whole range of non-traditional drug-crop producing and also transit coun-
tries from South and East Asia, Northern and Western Africa and Latin America started to include AD and 
other elements of a development-oriented drug policy in their respective domestic or regional drug policy 
framework documents. Thereby, these countries have contributed to a moment of unprecedented recogni-
tion of socio-economic factors and interventions to address the world drug problem. The annual reporting 
scheme to the UNODC also reflects the grown-up role of AD as an increasingly diversified element within 
global efforts of drugs supply control (UNODC 2015: 88–90). The formerly predominant approach of AD 
as a drug-crop substitution scheme has evolved into a plethora of highly diverse national approaches, 
stretching the once universally accepted AD definition from 1998 very far. AD may today combine rural 
development elements with regulatory mechanisms, the geographical or ethical acceptance of traditional 
growing and use of plant-based drugs, private business development or counterinsurgency measures (see 
e.g. Felbab-Brown 2010; Lupu 2004; Farthing & Kohl 2010; TNI 2010; Brombacher 2013; Windle 2015; 
Blickman 2017). The most remarkable observation within the UNGASS process is that not only some of 
the non-traditional proponent countries of AD reported cannabis or opium poppy cultivation on their ter-
ritories, but that also non-growing countries called for AD and announced AD to be implemented in their 
 2 See the contributions of UN Member States, regional bodies and civil society to the ‘zero draft’ for the 2016 UNGASS: https://
idpc.net/alerts/2015/09/the-zero-draft-for-the-2016-ungass-contributions-from-member-states-and-regional-bodies, accessed 
25.01.2018.
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respective countries or regions. Considering the very much rural character of traditional AD, many observ-
ers wondered how to interpret this renewed interest in the concept by non-traditional source countries 
for plant-based narcotic drugs.
UNGASS 2016 shed some light on this potential contradictory evolvement: as manifested through the 
national and regional contributions to the UNGASS Outcome Document (see section 3), a growing number 
of UN Member States have moved towards the recognition of their domestic drug problems as a direct result 
of underlying development deficits. This resulted in an expansion of the scope of development responses to 
drug issues beyond rural drug crop cultivating areas, calling for socio-economic interventions to deal with 
urban drug markets and drug trafficking (UN 2016: VII §h, j, k), once the exclusive economic zone of law 
enforcement.
Even though for many practitioners and experts this terminological widening has turned out to be a 
conceptual headache, it is fair to say that the monopoly of AD as the sole developmental response within 
UN drug supply control policy has been broken, opening leeway for a more coherent development-oriented 
drug policy for implementing agencies, the UNODC and affected countries. This new narrative can hardly 
be overrated. If some critics consider the UNGASS Outcome Document to be not innovative enough in its 
provisions – in the field of development a major yet silent revolution has taken place through the unequivo-
cal broadening of the scope of development within UN drug control, feeding directly into the much-needed 
approximation of the UN drug control system and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
A Driver of Sustainability: The Link Between SDGs and AD
Global drug control policies are interrelated with developmental issues in many ways, and therefore have an 
impact on the achievement of global sustainable development objectives (UNODC 2016a). However, some 
observers have found drug control polices to be inconsistent or even contradictory to the global develop-
ment agenda, especially in the field of illicit drug crop cultivation and production (Health Poverty Action 
2015; Buxton 2015; IEGDPM 2018). By taking a closer look at the policy linkages, much speaks in favor of 
locating AD into wider development roadmaps. 
UN Member States adopted the SDGs on 25 September 2015 with a term of 15 years. The ‘2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development’3 contains 17 goals and 169 targets that are universal in its coverage and 
are based on the pillars of social and economic development as well as environmental stability. Peace 
and security are recognized as essential elements for securing sustainable development (UNGA 2015). A 
fundamental pillar of the AD strategy is to address the root causes of the emergence and persistence of 
illicit drug economies in marginalized rural regions, which is complementary contributing to the achieve-
ment of the SDGs (UNODC 2016b). Only if social development measures are successful, communities can 
reduce illicit drug crop cultivation on the long-term and build sustainable economic alternatives. The 
linkages to the SDG system are obvious: The key element of AD targets SDG 1: ‘End poverty in all its forms 
everywhere’. Food security and licit livelihood opportunities are accomplished by the principles of non-
conditionality (BMZ 2012: 29–31) and the rejection of eradication before alternative sources of income are 
established – proper sequencing, as endorsed by the UN Plan of Action 2009 (§47f) and the UN Guiding 
Principles 2013 (§A9). Household food security is today a top priority in AD programming and is a key 
element contributing to SDG 2: ‘End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote 
sustainable agriculture’. Also, SDG 5, ‘Achieve gender equality and empower women and girls’, is consid-
ered by contemporary AD strategies due to the high level of gender-sensitivity of the global drug problem 
(UNODC 2015: 13–18; UNODC 2016a: 66–68).
Yet the links between global drug policies and the SDGs may be taken even further. It is only until recently 
that the negative effects of (rural) drug economies on the environment and climate have come to interna-
tional attention. Illegal drug crop cultivation is one of the main drivers of deforestation in several major illicit 
drug crop growing regions, a nexus that has been ignored for very long (UNODC 2016a: 86–94). Replacing 
monoculture coca cultivation through sustainable agroforestry models strengthens the biosphere, pro-
tects against soil erosion and desertification (GIZ 2014; GPDPD 2017) and adds to the indicators of SDG 13, 
‘Climate Action’, and SDG 15, ‘Life on Land’. AD is a crucial element to tackle the nexus of drugs and devel-
opment, which is highly interrelated with the relationship of drugs and conflict. SDG 16, on ‘Peace, Justice 
and Strong Institutions’, acknowledges that peace and stability are necessary conditions for an inclusive 
and sustainable development (IEGDPM 2018: 13–15). Communities that pursue a drugs-based livelihood 
 3 See General Assembly Resolution 70/1. 
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system are often located in rural conflict zones and experience fragility, violence as well as the presence of 
armed groups and organized crime. AD aims to build trust between state institutions and local communi-
ties by integrating them in broader rural development strategies, including through the improvement of 
social services like health and education. Colombia is a current example of a peace process interlinked with 
the illegal drug economy. In order to achieve a long-lasting and stable peace, the agreement between the 
government and former FARC guerrilla includes the formalization of land rights and a large scale substitu-
tion programme for illegal crops to end decades of internal armed conflict that was partially financed by 
coca cultivation and cocaine trafficking (OACP 2016: 104–123). 
The above-listed direct contributions to the SDGs are a sample of the main targets that can be addressed 
through a development-oriented drug policy approach. It reveals the potential of innovative drug policy: 
By measuring the impact of drug control through SDG indicators and not through a mere symptom assess-
ment like hectares of drug crops, its impact on vulnerable populations, human rights, development as well 
as conflict and peace can be analysed. Global drug policy has the potential to have a mutually reinforcing 
impact on the SDG framework. For example, the interconnection of AD and the SDGs in the fight against 
poverty, rural development, environmental sustainability, food security and climate change addresses at the 
same time the goals of sustainable development and the root causes for illicit drug crop cultivation (UNODC 
2015; Alimi 2016a; Alimi 2016b; IEGDPM 2018).
Despite the potential of development-oriented drug policies in contributing to the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development and the SDGs, a gap between the high expectations and the actual funding situa-
tion for AD is visible. From 1998 to 2013, only 0.2 percent of Official Development Assistance was spent on 
AD programmes (UNODC 2015: 83–85; Alimi 2016a: 4). The currently quite broad political support for AD 
at the international level does not reveal itself in a properly funded implementation agenda. Rather, AD can 
still be considered as a niche of policy intervention. However, recent funding trends seem to move towards 
broader AD portfolios with long-term AD interventions and diversification of the financial burden. A small 
number of donor countries and organizations – such as the European Union (EU) – stands out and revital-
izes the support by mainstreaming AD into a broader development framework. Given the complementary 
link between AD and the achievement of the SDGs, embedding the AD approach into the 2030 Sustainable 
Development Agenda reveals potential for innovative funding mechanisms by ‘taking the risk of sustain-
ability’ (Alimi 2016a: 22). 
Conclusion
UNGASS 2016 was the preliminary result of an impressive conceptual evolvement and political emancipa-
tion of the role of development within the international drug control system and its consensually approved 
guiding norms. In the post-UNGASS world, development-oriented drug policies – or drugs-oriented develop-
ment policies – have acquired a role that is more relevant in scope and recognition than at any other stage 
of the history of international drug control since the Shanghai Opium Protocol. The UNGASS 2016 Outcome 
Document exhibits the evolution of drug control towards the emancipation of development as an independ-
ent element of the guiding norms addressing the world drug problem, emerging from an assistant role in 
drug crop eradication efforts towards a narrative that covers the whole supply side spectrum. 
Nevertheless, the enhanced leeway to integrate development-oriented responses is rather poorly defined 
in conceptual terms, currently creating more confusion than guidance. How should effective development 
interventions in urban drug markets be designed? How could development interventions possibly take 
place in highly violent drug markets? What should be the target group of development interventions in 
drug trafficking situations? And how should the contributions of the plethora of potential AD and related 
interventions to the SDG indicators be credibly measured without losing sight of drug control targets? These 
are just some of the critical questions currently at stake, to be considered by the international drug policy 
and development community. The UNGASS Outcome Document does not give any conclusive answers to 
these pressing issues. At the same time, and beyond these conceptual concerns, the funding situation for 
AD remains to be worrisome. The gradual but steady enhancement of the development issue within the UN 
drug control system between the 1988 Convention and UNGASS has created expectations that cannot be 
fulfilled with the amount of funds invested for AD and related interventions. 
The resilient orientation of the global public on short-term reduction in drug crops, seizures and other 
easy-to-grasp indicators remains a major challenge for an increased funding and piloting of innovative 
approaches on the ground that seek change in the mid- and long-term. Nonetheless, this challenge is not 
new. It has existed since the very first AD projects decades ago and not been a decisive obstacle in making 
development a universally accepted element in global drug control – against great odds. 
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